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Every significant program contains many bugs1 that 
will cause it to fail to produce correct results when 
some particular combination of input data is 
encountered. 
This paper sets out recommendations for a two stage 
disclosure process2 in an attempt to avoid the 
problems with disclosure of computer data/material 
in court proceedings, problems that have been 
exposed in two cases in England: the Post Office 
Horizon scandal, and the case of the nurses in R v 
Cahill, R v Pugh, both of which are discussed below. 
Introduction 
There exists widespread misunderstanding about the 
nature of computers and how and why they are liable 
to fail. The decision of the High Court in Bates v Post 
Office Ltd Rev 13 (Horizon Issues) implies that the 
present approach to the disclosure and evaluation of 
evidence produced by computers in legal proceedings 
is unsatisfactory. 
The Post Office, as a private prosecutor, brought 
private prosecutions and secured resulting criminal 
convictions on the basis of data produced by the 
                                                          
1 The term ‘bug’ means an error, flaw, mistake or fault in a 
software program or system. Drawing from the work of 
Professor Ladkin (Peter B. Ladkin, On Classification of 
Factors in Failures and Accidents (Report RVS-Occ-99-02), 
available at https://rvs-bi.de/publications/), it is possible to 
classify most software errors into the following non-
exhaustive categories: human errors in coding and software 
development; software design or specification errors; 
unintended or unanticipated software interactions, input 
data flaws and deliberate errors caused by operators or 
hackers remotely. 
2 The recommendations are jurisdiction-neutral. 
‘Disclosure’ is used throughout this paper, and expressly 
includes ‘discovery’. 
3 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB), at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2019/3408.html 
 
Horizon computer system. That system was held by 
Mr Justice Fraser to have been unreliable and lacking 
in robustness.4 This was revealed in December 2019 
as the outcome of group civil litigation that involved 
557 claimants, and at a cost of several tens of millions 
of pounds. It is salutary that, but for that group civil 
litigation, the referral by the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission to the Court of Appeal of an 
unprecedented number of criminal convictions as 
possible miscarriages of justice would not have 
happened.5 
The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) 
concluded, under its Statement of Reasons, that those 
concerned should not (in its view) have been 
convicted, given Fraser J’s findings of fact about the 
unreliability of the  Post Office Horizon computer 
system. In addition, the CCRC’s view is that they 
should never have been prosecuted in the first place. 
A common feature of the Bates case is that the 
convictions were based upon inferences drawn from 
data produced by the Horizon computer system. The 
inference was that the subpostmaster or 
subpostmistress in question must have taken (stolen) 
the money evidenced by a computer ‘shortfall’. In this 
4 The word ‘reliable’ is used throughout this paper and used 
in accordance with the precise meaning as it is used in 
Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, Harold Thimbleby 
and Martyn Thomas CBE, ‘The Law Commission 
presumption concerning the dependability of computer 
evidence’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 17 (2020) 1-14, 
https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/5143. See 
also Peter Bernard Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’ Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 17 (2020) 15-
24, https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/5171. 
5 The Criminal Cases Review Commission’s process for 
review of convictions relating to the Post Office and 
Horizon accounting system (Number 2020-0040, 3 March 
2020), House of Commons Library, 
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-
briefings/cdp-2020-0040/. 
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respect, a systemic problem is apparent, so far as 
defendants appear routinely to have been wrongly 
convicted on unsatisfactory evidence and incomplete 
computer records. 
The material available to the CCRC to support the 
appeals only became available in the course of the 
group litigation in 2018-2019, almost 20 years after 
the first prosecutions by the Post Office for Horizon 
‘shortfalls’ following the introduction of the Horizon 
system in 1999. The system was supplied by Fujitsu. 
The Post Office disclosed error records for the first 
time in 2018. Fraser J found these records to be of 
central importance to his judgment on the most 
important of the preliminary issues: ‘To what extent 
was it possible or likely for bugs, errors or defects of 
the nature alleged … to have the potential (a) to cause 
apparent or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls relating 
to Subpostmasters’ branch accounts or transactions, 
or (b) undermine the reliability of Horizon accurately 
to process and to record transactions …’.6 These 
documents included the ‘Known Error Log’ or ‘KEL’. 
Fraser J in his judgment identified what he terms 
‘audit data’,7 also known as ARQ data.8 This data was 
the best evidence of particular branch transactions 
that was available to the Post Office and was held 
centrally by Fujitsu. It is a remarkable feature of 
Fraser J’s judgment that that data appears often not 
to have been obtained by the Post Office from Fujitsu. 
Fujitsu was contractually obliged to supply it to the 
Post Office. It appears an issue may have been cost, in 
so far as Fujitsu charged the Post Office to obtain 
access to that data. But, as Fraser J observed, cost is 
not a ground for important evidence not being 
obtained or disclosed. 
The legal presumption of the reliability of 
computers 
The present legal position is the result of the repeal of 
s. 69(1)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
                                                          
6 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB) at [18]. 
7 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB), [906] ‘Audit data is a complete 
and accurate record of everything that has occurred, which 
in the context of Horizon means including a full record of 
keystrokes used by a SPM (or assistant) in the branch. This 
accurate record is kept in what is called the audit store. This 
is a secure place for the keeping of such data. It is vital to 
the proper operation of a system such as Horizon that such 
accurate audit data is kept’; [919] ‘audit data requests (also 
called ARQ requests)’. 
1984 by s. 60 of the Youth and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999. The repeal was a response to the Law 
Commission recommendation in its paper Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings Hearsay and Related Topics 
(1997 Law Com. No. 216).9 Prior to its repeal, s. 69 
provided that: 
(1) In any proceedings, a statement in a 
document produced by a computer shall not be 
admissible as evidence of any fact stated 
therein unless it is shown …  
(b) That at all material times the computer 
was operating properly, or if not, that any 
respect in which it was not operating 
properly or was out of operation was not 
such as to affect the production of the 
document or the accuracy of its contents. 
PACE 1984 s. 69 subsection 1(b) represented a 
considerable imposition upon parties wishing to rely 
upon computer evidence. (The Civil Evidence Act 1968 
included analogous provisions, repealed by the Civil 
Evidence Act 1995.) 
In the absence of formal statutory requirements, as 
the Law Commission had suggested in its paper, the 
courts from 1999 have applied the presumption of the 
proper functioning of machines (for example, Castle v 
Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372, [1985] 1 All ER 87, [1984] 
Crim LR 682) to computers. A full discussion of the 
Law Commission’s recommendation, the repeal of s. 
69(1)(b) and the resulting evidential presumption of 
the correct working of computers – and a justification 
for the claims made in this paper – is to be found in 
the article by Ladkin and others, The Law Commission 
presumption concerning the dependability of 
computer evidence.10 
The presumption of the correct working of a computer 
is merely that. It is an evidential presumption that 
may be rebutted. The circumstances in which an 
effective challenge may be made such as to displace 
8 Note, Known Error Log (KEL) and Audit Data Requests 
(ARQ) were terms adopted and used by the Post Office and 
Fujitsu. 
9 The Law Commission paper was a response to a reference 
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department on 28 
April 1994, the reference itself was in response to the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice. 
10 Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, Harold Thimbleby 
and Martyn Thomas CBE, ‘The Law Commission 
presumption concerning the dependability of computer 
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the presumption will inevitably vary. In principle, the 
threshold for rebutting the presumption so that the 
onus of proof is upon the party relying upon a 
document to prove it, and thus prove the integrity 
and reliability of its computer source (where 
otherwise hearsay), is low. Once the presumption is 
displaced, then the evidential burden (onus of proof) 
moves to the person seeking to rely upon evidence 
derived from a computer. That is to say, the evidential 
burden is to prove that the source of the evidence 
may be relied upon, so that the document in question 
may be accepted as evidence of the facts stated 
therein. In a criminal trial that burden is to the 
criminal standard. 
Disclosure as a procedural problem 
As a matter of procedure, the Post Office Bates 
litigation suggests that the kind of documents that (a) 
are likely to exist, and (b) ought to be disclosed as a 
matter of course, where data/documents generated 
by a computer system of any size are in issue, are 
possibly not generally well-understood or recognised. 
It is a matter of surprise that important documentary 
records, such as the Fujitsu Known Error Log (KEL), 
were disclosed only in response to a direction from 
the court and in the face of opposition by the Post 
Office. These were disclosed by the Post Office in 
2018. But as Fraser J noted, the KEL was ‘a 
comprehensive record of the errors and defects of 
which Fujitsu had become aware over the life of the 
Horizon system’.11 The vital importance of this 
evidence is identified at paragraph [559] of his 
judgment: 
‘There are certain categories or descriptions of 
classes of documents that have featured heavily 
in the evidence at the Horizon Issues trial. The 
path to disclosing them has not always been 
smooth. The majority, if not all, of the technical 
documents that relate to how Horizon was 
actually operating in fact in IT terms are in the 
possession of either the Post Office or (more 
usually) Fujitsu. The two most important 
categories, in my judgment, are Known Error 
Logs (also known as “KELs”) and PEAKs. The first 
of these records or logs known errors, which 
means errors with the Horizon system. The 
                                                          
evidence’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 17 (2020) 1-14, 
https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/5143 
latter is a browser-based software incident and 
problem management system used by Fujitsu 
for the Post Office account, in other words for 
incidents and problems associated with Horizon 
that occur.’ 
Fraser J found that the Post Office by its defence 
maintained a position on the KEL that was misleading 
and substantially wrong (paragraph [582]). In 
correspondence, the Post Office’s solicitors 
questioned that the KEL records existed, a matter 
Fraser J found to be ‘disturbing’ (paragraph [577]). 
Thereafter, the Post Office contended by its counsel 
that the KEL was ‘irrelevant’ – a ‘complete red herring’ 
(paragraph [587]). In fact, the KEL was of fundamental 
importance to Fraser J’s judgment on the principal 
preliminary issue of the Horizon system’s reliability 
and propensity to fail in the way alleged by the 
claimants. When established that the KEL both (i) 
existed and (ii) was relevant, the Post Office’s position 
was that the documents were not within its power to 
disclose (paragraph [605]) – a contention that Fraser J 
rejected. 
Fraser J deals with related PEAK error records (a 
browser-based incident management system) and the 
manner of their disclosure by the Post Office at 
paragraphs [615]-[621] of his judgment. Two weeks 
before exchange of experts’ reports for trial in March 
2019, the Post Office disclosed 218,000 different PEAK 
error records. 
Given the scale of the litigation, the Post Office’s 
strenuous resistance to disclosing its Horizon 
computer error records and logs, most if not all of 
which appear not to have been disclosed in the many 
previous prosecutions by the Post Office of its 
subpostmasters and subpostmistresses and others, is 
a matter of concern. 
Further, that for 18 years the Post Office appears not 
to have disclosed documents routinely maintained 
and kept for any computer system of any size and 
complexity, suggests that existing disclosure 
arrangements in legal proceedings do not work 
effectively, and in any event are inadequate to secure 
their intended purpose – fairness or ‘equality of arms’. 
11 [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB) at [610]. 
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A significant problem arises when there is a serious 
imbalance in information and data available to a 
party. In many cases, no doubt, the kind of problem to 
which disclosure may be relevant in any given legal 
proceedings may be apparent from the factual 
circumstances. This may well not apply where an issue 
arises in connection with the reliability of a computer 
system, because the cause of failure may well not be 
obvious, as it was not obvious with the Post Office’s 
Horizon computer. 
Thus, where a person challenging evidence derived 
from a computer is required to identify the issue to 
which the disclosure is relevant, they may typically be 
unable to do so, because they will not have been privy 
to the circumstances in which the system in question 
is known to fail or to have failed. General or 
unfocussed disclosure requests tend to be rejected by 
the courts in these circumstances on grounds of their 
being ‘fishing expeditions’. There is a risk, in such 
circumstances, of a party with access to relevant data 
and disclosable material being able to be obstructive 
and to avoid giving relevant disclosure. 
This problem has been acknowledged by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Guide on 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Right to a fair trial (criminal limb):12 
‘In the context of disclosure of evidence, 
complex issues may arise concerning the 
disclosure of electronic data, which may 
constitute a certain mass of information in [the] 
hands of the prosecution. In such a case, an 
important safeguard in the sifting process is to 
ensure that the defence is provided with an 
opportunity to be involved in the laying-down 
                                                          
12 (August 2020), paragraph 166, at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_criminal
_eng.pdf. 
13 The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure for 
investigators, prosecutors and defence practitioners (2020) 
(not in force at the time of writing) is a step in the right 
direction in respect of electronic material, for which see 
paragraphs 54-57, and in which the overriding obligation to 





14 James Christie, ‘The Post Office Horizon IT scandal and 
the presumption of the dependability of computer 
of the criteria for determining what might be 
relevant for disclosure’. 
We agree. There is much to be said for rules of court 
providing for a collaborative approach for the 
disclosure of documents in this context - and to some 
extent a collaborative approach is already provided 
for in connection with disclosure of electronic 
documents more generally.13 It is plainly unsafe and 
unsatisfactory for a defendant/objector to be required 
to identify the specific issue to which disclosure is said 
by them to be relevant. Such a requirement, as noted, 
will frequently be impossible for a defendant to 
comply with. 
Presuming the correct working of 
computers – an unsafe presumption? 
While the convenience that was sought to be 
achieved by repeal of s. 69(1)(b) of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is understandable, a 
presumption that a computer ‘works correctly’ in 
itself is unsafe and, for anyone with expertise in the 
area, will appear wholly unreal, because it suggests a 
binary question of whether the computer is working 
or not.14 The reality is more complex.15 All computers 
have a propensity to fail, possibly seriously. That is to 
say, they have a latent propensity to function 
incorrectly. 
A program on a mobile telephone might hitherto have 
contained tens of thousands of lines of software code. 
A program such as Horizon will contain tens of 
millions of lines of code, and will be exceedingly 
complex. Programming is a human task and 
programmers make mistakes; an error rate in writing 
software code of 10 errors per thousand lines of code 
evidence’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review 17 (2020) 49-70, 
https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/5226 and 
Peter Bernard Ladkin, ‘Robustness of software’ Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 17 (2020) 15-
24, https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/5171. 
15 Stephen Mason and Daniel Seng, editors, Electronic 
Evidence (4th edn, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies for 
the SAS Humanities Digital Library, School of Advanced 
Study, University of London, 2017), Chapter 6, 
https://humanities-digital-
library.org/index.php/hdl/catalog/book/electronicevidence
(the 5th edition is to be published in 2021). 




Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 18 (2021) | 22 
is considered good, 1 error per thousand lines is rarely 
if ever achieved. 
To give an example, McDermid and Kelly reported 
that the Ministry of Defence ‘funded the retrospective 
static analysis of the [Hercules] C130J [transport 
aircraft] software, previously developed to [civilian 
aerospace software standard RTCA DO-178B],16 and 
determined that it contained about 1.4 safety- critical 
faults per kLoC17 (the overall flaw density was around 
23 per kLoC…whilst a fault density of 1 per kLoC may 
seem high it is worth noting that commercial software 
is around 30 faults per kLoC, with initial fault injection 
rates of over 100 per kLoC.’)18 ‘Safety- critical faults’ 
means faults whose possible consequences include 
system failures causing damage including injury or 
death and/or damage to the environment.19 
Further, computers of any complexity often interact 
with other systems. Such interfaces create complexity 
and augment the risk of failure (as found, for example, 
in the frequent problems/failures encountered with 
the ‘Riposte’ communication platform in the ‘Legacy 
Horizon’ version of the system that the Post Office 
operated until 2010). 
It follows from the discussion above that every 
significant program will contain many bugs that will 
cause it to fail to produce correct results when some 
particular combination of input data is encountered. 
It is the presence of software bugs that can determine 
the reliability of a system, measured, for example, in 
terms of the frequency with which it will fail during 
operation. (Environmental conditions and 
cybersecurity issues can also affect a system and 
result in faults and failures.) 
It is known that the effect of bugs upon system 
reliability can vary enormously, some of them will be 
seen very rarely, perhaps never in the lifetime of the 
system. Others will occur more frequently and thus 
contribute more to unreliability. Further, bugs by their 
                                                          
16 RTCA/DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne 
Systems and Equipment Certification, December 1, 1992. 
17 Thousand lines of code. 
18 John McDermid and Tim Kelly, Software in Safety-Critical 
Systems: Achievement and Prediction, Nuclear Future 
02(03), 2006, 3.1. Preliminary version is available at 
https://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/tpk/inuce2004.pdf. 
19 See: The Law Commission presumption concerning the 
dependability of computer evidence. 
nature can vary greatly in the seriousness of the 
failures that they induce. 
During the development of a software system, some 
bugs will be detected and removed – for example, by 
testing. There are statistical (and other) techniques 
that allow this kind of information to be used to draw 
inferences about the bugs that remain when the 
system is put into operation. It is the 
remaining/unresolved bugs and their effects that will 
determine the reliability of the system. 
As a system is used, more will be learned about its 
reliability. However, even for a system that has so far 
been reliable in use, it cannot be presumed that when 
a failure occurs this is not a result of a software bug. 
That is to say, the absence of evidence of failure is not 
equivalent to evidence of absence of bugs – a 
misconception that appears in the Post Office 
prosecutions and in the Post Office’s evidence in the 
Bates litigation. This misunderstanding is closely 
related to the common misapprehension that 
computer errors will be apparent to an operator (see 
below). 
Common false perceptions and beliefs 
The Law Commission, in its review of the law on 
hearsay evidence in Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: 
Hearsay and Related Topics (1997), under Part XIII 
‘Computer Evidence’, suggested that ‘most computer 
error is either immediately detectable or results from 
error in the data entered into the machine’.20 It is true 
that an error that causes a system crash is usually 
immediately detectable, and also true that the 
behaviour of a computer system is determined by 
data entered into the machine at some point in the 
past. It is, however, wrong to conclude that every, or 
even most, erroneous output from a computer will 
have been caused by the user affected by it. Further, 
it is not true that most computer system failures will 
be detectable by the user of the system. The latter 
proposition is of particular importance. In decided 
 
20 Professor Colin Tapper in ‘Discovery in Modern Times: A 
Voyage around the Common Law World’ (1991) 67 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 217, 248 cited by the Law Commission in 
its 1997 paper at paragraph 13.7. 
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cases there is some support for this popular, though 
erroneous, view, for example: DPP v McKeown and 
Jones [1997] 1 WLR 295, 301C-D and R v Governor of 
Pentonville Prison Ex p Osman (No 1) [1990] 1 WLR 
277, 306H. The proposition is known to have been 
relied upon by the Post Office in prosecuting its sub-
postmasters. The perception and commonly held 
belief is wrong. Mr Justice Fraser addressed this issue 
in his Horizon Issues judgment: 
‘[972] Did the Horizon IT system itself alert 
Subpostmasters of such bugs, errors or defects 
as described in (1) above and if so how? 
[973] Answer: Although the experts were 
agreed that the extent to which any IT system 
can automatically alert its users to bugs within 
the system itself is necessarily limited, and 
although Horizon has automated checks which 
would detect certain bugs, they were also 
agreed that there are types of bugs which 
would not be detected by such checks. Indeed, 
the evidence showed that some bugs lay 
undiscovered in the Horizon system for years. 
This issue is very easy, therefore, to answer. 
The correct answer is very short. The answer to 
Issue 12 is “No, the Horizon system did not alert 
SPMs”. The second part of the issue does not 
therefore arise.’ 
The Post Office prosecutions are by no means the only 
instances where the failure to recognise the possible 
unreliability of computer evidence/data has led to 
serious miscarriages of justice. 
In R v Cahill, R v Pugh,21 the court was concerned with 
alleged wilful neglect (possibly as serious a charge as 
can be made against a healthcare professional), a 
view that, it transpired, was based on the mistaken 
interpretation of corrupt NHS patient data. Professor 
Harold Thimbleby, one of the authors of this paper, 
was an expert witness in the case. In a subsequent 
paper, Thimbleby commented: ‘… The broader 
problem is the uncritical acceptance of IT, from legal, 
regulatory, procurement and other perspectives… . 
…[N]obody seems to be fully aware of the complexity 
and risks of IT. This results in lax legislation, lax 
regulation and lax procurement, and, in turn, lax 
                                                          
21 14 October 2014, at Cardiff Crown Court (T20141094, 
T20141061). The judge’s ruling was published in the Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 14 (2017) 67-
71, https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/2541. 
manufacturing since no useful standards of quality 
can be demanded by hospitals. Unawareness, in turn, 
results in lax management, and, unnoticed 
inconsistencies between clinical care and its 
unreliable monitoring’.22 The 73 nurses subject to 
disciplinary proceedings were, presumably, 
conscientious healthcare professionals whose lives 
were turned upside-down by misunderstood and 
unreliable computer data that was uncritically 
accepted. 
Recommendations 
The dilemma is that all computer systems can and are 
likely to fail, and thus produce erroneous output. 
However, insufficiently specific applications – ‘fishing 
expeditions’ – for disclosure of computer data are 
discouraged by the court (not least on grounds of 
being wasteful). The question arises as to how the 
courts can balance and resolve these considerations, 
that point in opposite directions so far as the 
disclosure of material is concerned. 
The starting position will, of course, remain that 
disclosure, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, 
will be of material that is recognised to adversely 
affect the disclosing party’s case or, alternatively, 
assist the case of the opposing party (or is otherwise 
relied upon by the disclosing party). 
It is beyond the scope of the recommendations below 
to elaborate how data should be disclosed, other than 
to note that the mere disclosure of ‘data’ is not 
sufficient if it is not adequately defined for the 
purpose. For example, if data is encrypted, data has 
been disclosed, but it is not usable (technically, may 
not be ‘inspected’) until further details (in this case a 
decryption keyword) are provided. 
Where the reliability of computer data is challenged 
on reasonable (as distinct from fanciful) grounds, it is 
suggested that a two-stage approach can be adopted. 
(A relevant consideration in the court’s approach to 
disclosure should be whether the data or evidence in 
question is the only evidence or is otherwise of critical 
importance, as typically it was in the Post Office 
prosecutions.) 
22 Harold Thimbleby, ‘Misunderstanding IT: Hospital 
cybersecurity and IT problems reach the courts’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 15 (2018) 11-
32, https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/4891. 
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Stage 1 
(i) As a matter of procedure, disclosure should be 
given of: 
(a) Known bugs in the system that have been 
reported, and the actions taken in response. 
This should include the disclosure of known 
error logs,23 release notices,24 change logs25 
and similar documents. 
(b) The party’s information security 
standards and processes. This should extend 
to cover logical access controls26 (including 
emergency access), security vulnerability 
notifications27 and security patches.28 
(c) Relevant audits of systems and the 
management of the installation to provide 
assurance that suitable standards and 
processes have been implemented and 
complied with. 
(d) Evidence of reliably managed records of 
error reports and system changes, including 
evidence to demonstrate that basic 
precautions such as digital signatures have 
been implemented to detect and limit 
accidental or deliberate corruption. 
(ii) The disclosure set out above should be provided by 
a person authorised to do so by the party subject to 
the disclosure obligation. The party with the 
disclosure obligation should be required to undertake 
a reasonable and proportionate search for the 
documents and records in question. Disclosure should 
be supported by evidence confirming that a 
reasonable and proportionate search has been 
                                                          
23 Records of the errors that have been reported in a system 
and what action was taken. This should include evidence of 
testing after each system change to ensure that the same 
error has not been reintroduced. 
24 Documentation of the changes that have been made in 
each new release of the software, including identifying all 
the known errors that have been corrected. 
25 Records of every change that has been made to the 
software (containing information about what was changed, 
what was affected, and what the results were, together 
with any resulting problems), including by whom, when and 
why it was done. 
26 Organisational processes and software controls that 
ensure data and systems can be read, changed, created and 
deleted only by people who have been properly authorised 
and identified. 
undertaken by a person with appropriate authority 
and knowledge, and that: 
(a) The records disclosed are believed to be 
the records of the relevant standards, 
processes and audits, and of the known 
defects, security vulnerabilities, fixes and 
changes in the system. 
(b) The party seeking to rely upon the 
evidence in question has taken reasonable 
steps to satisfy itself that access to the 
system is controlled in such a way that 
unauthorised and undetected amendment 
of system data, in a way that might affect 
the evidence in question, is prevented.29 
(iii) The disclosure exercise should, where possible, be 
collaborative and co-operative between the parties, 
rather than adversarial. In particular: 
(a) The parties should, if possible, seek to 
agree that the disclosed data is in a form 
that takes into account that the party to 
whom the disclosure is made should be able 
to conveniently read/use it. 
(b) It should not be required that the party 
challenging the reliability of the data relied 
upon should identify the particular issue to 
which the disclosure required to be given is 
alleged to go. 
(iv) The documents under Stage 1 will be routinely 
kept and easily available for a bespoke system 
professionally developed and managed. The absence 
of such records will ordinarily suggest poor quality 
software/system management. For commercial-off-
the-shelf software it should be enough to provide 
27 Notifications of a vulnerability in a software product that 
could allow unauthorized access to the system to 
compromise the integrity, availability, or confidentiality of 
an organisation’s systems or data. 
28 Software changes to correct security vulnerabilities, often 
made to software systems between releases of the 
software because an error has been detected that is too 
important to wait for a new system release to correct it. 
29 The issue of remote access by a third party to Horizon 
branch terminals was a major issue in the Post Office Bates 
litigation. The fact that such access was possible was only 
conceded by the Post Office in January 2019. It had in fact 
been practiced from early after the introduction of the 
Horizon system in 1999. Fraser J considered the issue to be 
of central importance. Until 2010 no records were kept by 
Fujitsu of such actions. 
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evidence of the particular version and release of the 
software and to disclose release documentation 
(usually publicly available from the supplier) for the 
relevant version and subsequent releases. (The latter 
will reveal errors in the version in question later found 
and corrected.) In either case, proportionate Stage 1 
disclosure should not be onerous, and for a 
professionally managed system should be a 
straightforward exercise. 
Stage 2 
(i) If the limited disclosure under Stage 1 reveals any 
one or more of the following: 
(a) a level of recorded defects or failures 
sufficiently high to provide grounds for 
questioning the reliability of the computer 
system from which the material is derived; 
(b) that there exist records of specific 
defects or failures that provide grounds for 
questioning the evidence sought to be relied 
upon; 
(c) that a person seeking to rely upon the 
evidence in question is not able to 
demonstrate that it has adequate control 
over the systems or data, 
then the party seeking to rely upon the evidence 
produced by the computer system in question should 
be required to prove that none of the facts or matters 
identified under (a)-(c) above might affect the 
reliability of the material sought to be relied upon. 
(ii) It is known that all large computer systems contain 
bugs, and that some of these may be ‘small’ bugs that 
reveal themselves rarely. This is true even for those 
systems that have been shown convincingly to be very 
reliable. It follows that, even in the case of such a 
reliable system, the court should have regard to the 
possibility that an apparent failure may be the 
consequence of a bug manifesting itself.30 Evidence of 
reliability is not evidence of the absence of software 
bugs. The court should consider what degree of doubt 
remains in the context of all the other available 
evidence. 
                                                          
30 For which see Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev Littlewood, 
Harold Thimbleby and Martyn Thomas CBE, ‘The Law 
Commission presumption concerning the dependability of 
computer evidence’, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 17 (2020) 1-14, 
https://journals.sas.ac.uk/deeslr/article/view/5143. 
Concluding comment 
It is likely that the procedural and evidential 
safeguards of the kind discussed, that might readily be 
provided under the rules of court, would have avoided 
the disastrous repeated apparent miscarriages of 
justice over the past 20 years. (Nevertheless, even 
with those procedural safeguards, the miscarriage of 
justice may not be altogether avoided.) Those 
apparent miscarriages of justice have occurred since 
the repeal of s. 69(1)(b) of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 in April 200031 for the reasons 
given by Mr Justice Fraser in Bates v Post Office Ltd 
Rev 1.32 But for that group litigation, the fact of the 
fundamental unreliability of the Post Office’s Horizon 
computer system would not have been revealed. 
© Paul Marshall, James Christie, Peter Bernard Ladkin, 
Bev Littlewood, Stephen Mason, Martin Newby, Dr 
Jonathan Rogers, Harold Thimbleby and Martyn 
Thomas CBE, 2020 
 
Paul Marshall, Barrister, Cornerstone Barristers, 2-3 
Gray’s Inn Square, Gray’s Inn 
James Christie, independent testing consultant with 
35 years’ IT experience as a system developer and 
designer, business analyst, IT auditor, project 
manager, test manager and information security 
manager 
Peter Bernard Ladkin, Professor i.R. of Computer 
Networks and Distributed Systems, Bielefeld 
University and CEO of tech-transfer companies 
Causalis Limited and Causalis Ingenieurgesellschaft 
mbH 
Bev Littlewood, Emeritus Professor of Software 
Engineering, Centre for Software Reliability, City, 
University of London 
Stephen Mason, Barrister 
Martin Newby, Emeritus Professor of Statistical 
Science, City, University of London 
31 Repealed on 14 April 2000 by the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 ss. 60, 67(3), Sch; Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (Commencement No 2) 
Order 2000, art 2(c), Sch. 
32 [2019] EWHC 3408 QB. 




Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 18 (2021) | 26 
 
Dr Jonathan Rogers, University Lecturer in Criminal 
Justice, Faculty of Law, Cambridge University, Fellow 
of Fitzwilliam College, co-Deputy Director of the 
Cambridge Centre for Criminal Justice, co-Director of 
Criminal Law Reform Now Network 
Harold Thimbleby, Professor and See Change Digital 
Health Fellow, Swansea University, Wales, and Visiting 
Professor, UCL, London, Emeritus Professor, Gresham 
College, London 
Martyn Thomas CBE, Emeritus Professor, Gresham 
College, London and Visiting Professor of Software 
Engineering at Aberystwyth University, Wales 
 
